The article looks at the conflict taking place in Ukraine since 2014 and characterises its nature as hybrid warfare. The author examines documents of international and humanitarian law, as well as the reactions to described events from international perspective. Questions are raised concerning the adequacy of current legal solutions in the face of evolution of war itself.
Introduction
The nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict differs from the experiences of past military armed conflicts that took place on the territory of Europe. It is characterised by escalation occurring in phases and the use of various forms of non-military and military influence with different degrees of intensity. From the social disturbances located in the centre of Kiev, it turned into the succession of the Crimean Peninsula, followed by its annexation by the Russian Federation and finally exploding as a rebellion in the eastern industrialised Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The bloody armed struggle between the rebels supported by the regular armed formations of the Russian Federation, including special forces, and Ukraine's regular armed forces and volunteer formations stopped a fragile truce. The conflict involved propaganda, information, diplomatic and economic actions.
That 'fog of war' set in the hybrid warfare structure can be compared to a demon, in front of which not only reason but also international law, especially international humanitarian law of armed conflicts and international human rights law, stay asleep. Hybrid warfare as a new concept for conducting armed conflicts in the 21 st century gives us reason to think, according to the words of Marcus Cicero inter arma tacent leges 1 , to what extent it influences the application and enforcement of public international law, and as a result to determine in which areas that law needs to be adapted by adopting the adequate legal standards. A key point here seems to be to determine the impact of hybrid warfare on the protection of fundamental humanitarian values as set out in customary and treaty humanitarian law of armed conflicts. It is not without significance that persons injured in a hybrid conflict can claim damages before courts, as well as the fact that state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts can be implemented. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict taking place at our eastern state borders was described in this paper as a main case study as it has recently been a subject of intense public interest.
Evolution of the prohibition on the use of force in international law

Development of the prohibition on the use of force in international documents
The right of states to declare and conduct war as an instrument of the settlement of international disputes was significantly restricted by the Covenant of the League of Nations. That process was continued in the interwar period by the adoption of the General Treaty for Renunciation of War, also called the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Paris, 27 August 1928) 2 , followed by the Resolution of Assembly of the League of Nations (11 March 1932) 3 . The above-mentioned acts ruled out the possibility of aggressive declaration and conduct of war and thus undermined the legal effects of territorial acquisitions resulting from war operations.
The new international regulations led the states committing aggressive actions to give the cases for use of armed force a legal defensive character. To justify and legalise them, they attempted to prove the legitimacy of a self-defence action using available propaganda and diplomatic measures. The initiators of wars resorted to military provocations claiming that the use of armed force is dictated by the interests of the population of the attacked state, is conducted by invitation of the puppet governments, the occupation is peaceful in nature and military operations aimed at police work and order maintenance are below the threshold of war.
The Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter referred to as: UN Charter), being a kind of constitution for the contemporary international community, establishes the global post-war peace order and sanctions the delegalisation of aggression after World War II. Its Article 2 introduces the prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, conferring on the Security Council 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' 
Comments on terminology
Although the literal interpretation of Article 2 Section 4 of the UN Charter seems to be obvious, it turned out to be insufficient in practice. The legal doctrine emphasises that the classical international law had already made a distinction between such terms as: war, war operations, de facto state of war, intervention, armed intervention, military expedition, military measures and paramilitary acts. In the 20 th century, the terms, such as covert intervention, destabilisation, sedition, secret war, export of revolution and preventive attack, were added to the list, thereby eliminating the concept of 'war' from the international law documents 10 13 . In doctrinal terms, 'war' means breaking off peaceful relations between states and turning to war relations characterised by an armed struggle and hostile acts against the other state under the national procedure for declaration of war 14 . The term 'war' is related to cases of the use of armed force between states or groups of states. The UN Charter introduced a new terminology using the following terms: 'aggression', 'use of force', 'armed attack' and 'intervention'.
Article 2, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, confirms the universal application of humanitarian law in all armed conflicts regardless of their nature 15 . An official declaration of war or issuance of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war do not affect the application of international humanitarian law of armed conflicts 16 . The recognition of the above-mentioned state by any party to the conflict remains irrelevant. Its occurrence is decided by the scale of hostilities.
The definition of 'aggression' reflecting the binding customary law as well as cases of acts of aggression are included in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 17 . Aggression is defined as the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations (Article 1). Article 3 of the Resolution lists seven states qualified as acts of aggression regardless of declaration of war 18 . The Resolution 3314 (XXIX) provides the interpretation of the UN Charter that does not include any legal definitions of 'aggression' or 'act of aggression'. A special emphasis was given to the use of armed force, thus leaving such states as: economic pressure, economic coercion, political attacks, cyberattacks and most elements of hybrid warfare outside the definitional framework of the Resolution. The list of acts of aggression is not exhaustive, which means that the UN Security Council may consider other acts as acts of aggression (Article 4) 19 . The use of armed force falling into the concept of 'aggression' needs to be 'of sufficient gravity' 20 bearing in mind the quantity and quality of the armed force used. Verification criteria include: extent and gravity of violation, scope of operations, size of the seized territory, personal and property damages caused, taking self-defence actions and the degree of threat to international peace.
Elements of hybrid warfare
The concept of 'war' On a doctrinal basis, the concept of 'war' does not correspond to any political, military and social concepts of 'war on terror' or 'hybrid warfare'. Some elements of war on terror are international or non-international armed conflicts to which international humanitarian law of armed conflicts should be applied 24 were denied. For the purposes of that practice, hybrid concepts of 'enemy combatant' and 'unlawful combatant' were introduced. By setting up and expanding the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and using other transitional camps (among others in Poland) the United States used torture against civilian persons and prisoners of armed conflict in Afghanistan as well as against persons captured in other regions of the globe to obtain intelligence, which violated the non-derogable rights of an individual.
Hybrid warfare, as shown in the following diagram, is a combination of conventional military forces, police forces, irregular rebel operations, cyberattacks, disinformation, psychological influence, economic destabilisation, hostile diplomacy, spreading religious hatred etc. 
Asymmetry of contemporary armed conflicts
The contemporary inter-state and intrastate conflicts are characterised by the asymmetry of military potentials used by the parties to the conflict in the sense that there is no guarantee that a party with a higher technological military or organisational potential achieves victory and that it is not sufficient to use only military means. 
The concept and constituent elements of hybrid warfare
Under international humanitarian law of armed conflicts, hybrid warfare is a conflict in which actual events corresponding to the legal status of international and noninternational armed conflicts occur simultaneously, including internal disturbances subject to regulations of national law and international human rights law. Hybrid warfare employs a broad range of tools: 'Over the course of the crisis, Russian leaders denied any active involvement but sent irregular forces dubbed 'little green men', spread propaganda and encouraged local unrest, assembled regular forces at the border, and engaged in diplomacy trying to keep up the narrative that Moscow was not a party to the conflict'
28 . In the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), General Philip M. Breedlove, 'What we see in Russia now in this hybrid approach to war is to use all of the tools that they have (…) to reach into a nation and cause instability, use their energy tools, use their finance tools, use what I think is probably the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of informational warfare, using all these tools to stir up problems that they can then begin to exploit with their military tool -through coercion (…) 31 , in which war crimes committed during international and non-international (domestic) armed conflicts are defined. However, according to Article 8 Section 2 d) and f) those provisions do not apply to 'situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature (…)' 32 . Article 7 of the ICC Statute grants protection to the civilian population in peacetime as well. It concerns acts bearing the hallmarks of crime against humanity. As far as the Maidan crimes of murder are concerned, Article 7 Section 1 a) and Section 2 a) of the ICC Statute relating to an attack against civilian population could be analysed. According to the Elements of Crime, murder of one or more persons where the perpetrator intended the conduct to be a part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population includes the elements of crime against humanity.
Although Ukraine did not ratify the ICC Statute, it recognised the jurisdiction of the Court by lodging a declaration with the Registrar relating to the crimes of murder committed during the protests in Maidan (Article 12 Section 2 and 3).
Second phase -annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation
In the Memorandum on Security Assurances (Budapest, 5 December 1994), the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Russian Federation provided security assurances for the territorial integrity of Ukraine reaffirming their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 33 . Taking over the Ukrainian nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation reaffirmed the inviolability of its borders.
On 27 February 2014, unmarked attackers overran the building of the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The former authorities were replaced and a referendum on the extension of autonomy was announced. On 11 March 2014, the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council issued a declaration of independence which proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Crimea referring to the Kosovo case, or more precisely, to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter referred to as: ICJ) of 22 July 2010 finding that a unilateral declaration of independence, as a rule, does Federation, delegating 'soldiers on leave' within armed groups and irregular units to conduct armed attacks against Ukraine equal to acts of aggression, including capturing the ships of the Ukrainian navy preceded by a sea blockade of Crimea.
The referred acts correspond to the definition of 'aggression' as set out in the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) as well as to the ICJ statement qualifying particular actions as aggression. The judgment concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua is relevant here, according to which a state was held responsible for the activities of armed groups being de facto its agents 37 . Furthermore, activities conducted by regular forces and the sending of armed bands or groups by or on behalf of a state which conducts such serious armed operations that they may result in an attack with use of regular armed forces or with their significant involvement were included in the concept of 'armed attack' 38 .
Attempts to legitimise aggression in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
Right to self-determination of peoples
The right to self-determination of peoples reserved for the decolonisation process connected with violation of human rights, discrimination and the lack of influence on exercise of power over the inhabited region are not applicable to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. It does not authorise or encourage any actions that could lead to disruption or the partial or full violation of the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states with governments able to represent the whole population of the particular territory without distinction to race, religion or colour. The following arguments can negate the legality of secessionist activities of the autonomous authorities of Crimea and their decision to join the Russian Federation: the referendum was held against the will of the Ukrainian government, during the occupation of the peninsula by Russian forces, in breach of domestic law, requiring not a local but nationwide referendum 39 . The question arises as to whether it is justified to look for similarities between the secession of the Republic of Crimea and the secession of Kosovo. The initial analysis shows many differences between both secessions. In Crimea, no independent mass political movement or military actions of population interested in the secession could be observed. No internal disintegration factors justifying the violation of the territorial 37 P. Grzebyk integrity of Ukraine were developed. Owing to the scale of ethnic cleansing and international crimes in Kosovo, there appeared a precondition for remedia secession. The secession of the Republic of Crimea (20 February -21 March 2014) ended up in accession to the Russian Federation and persecution of the non-Russian population (especially Crimean Tatars). Kosovo, on the other hand, was after the civil war still under a protectorate administered by the United Nations Organisation (hereinafter referred to as: UNO), supported by the Kosovo Force, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
The NATO military operation in Kosovo was conducted with involvement of the international community, unlike in the Crimean Peninsula, whose occupation by the Russian Federation started without regard for the international community The UNO did not adopt such a resolution in response to the proclamation of the new state of Kosovo. In the opinion of the IJC, the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international law and its secession should be treated as an exception that is not suitable for a schematic reproduction 41 . As there are no similarities, resorting to parallels and legitimising the secession of Crimea on the basis of international decisions and actual conditions typical for the secession of Kosovo seem to be unjustified. In the stance of the Russian Federation, an internal contradiction can be noticed. On the one hand, the right of Kosovo to secession has been denied and the state itself has not been recognised, on the other hand, the case of the 'illegal' secession of Kosovo has been referred to as a factual and legal basis for the legality of the secession of Crimea and its accession to Russia. With the annexation, the Russian Federation carried out an act of aggression against Ukraine.
Military intervention to protect nationals
An intervention to protect nationals is defined as use of armed force against a state, on whose territory the nationals of the intervening state are subject to threat, in accordance with the concepts of necessity and proportionality 42 of legality as a basis, armed interventions to protect nationals can be divided into: lawful (with the consent of the territorial state) 43 , tolerated (without the consent of a state which is unwilling or unable to protect nationals itself, initiated only after the exhaustion of all peaceful means of settling disputes) 44 , unlawful (without the consent of a state, carried out against non-nationals of a state; however, having ethic, language or cultural ties with it).
The systematic analysis speaks in favour of the legitimacy of armed intervention to protect nationals in the first two cases which, taking into account the actual state, do not correspond to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. A threat to Russian nationals was given, among other things, as a reason to justify the Russian President's petition for permission to use armed forces in the territory of Ukraine. That argument remains irrelevant under international law as based on national regulations of the Russian Federation. The armed operations against Ukraine do not fulfil legal preconditions for armed intervention aimed at protection of nationals, as they refer to non-nationals of the intervening state having only ethnic, language or cultural ties with it.
Military assistance on request
The roots of military assistance on request, also called intervention by invitation or intervention on request, should be sought in international humanitarian law of armed conflicts. Military assistance on request means direct military assistance by the sending of armed forces by one to another state upon the latter's request (Article 1 a) of the Resolution of the Institute of International Law of 8 September 2011) 45 . The request as a free expression of will of the requesting state must provide detailed terms and modalities of assistance which are in conformity with the international obligations of the requesting state 
Responsibility to protect
The concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) is a continuation of the protective message of humanitarian intervention. The Resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005 (60th session, High-Level Plenary Meeting in New York) affirmed the responsibility of each state towards the international community to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity through diplomatic, humanitarian and other means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter 50 . The United Nations member states are not obliged to conduct automatic armed intervention -it's solely the right to react 
UN Charter).
A decision on use of force is taken by the Security Council on a case-to--case basis when the criteria of legitimate authority, such as just cause (just reason, the highest humanitarian necessity), right intention (halting or averting human suffering), last resort (ineffectiveness of lesser measures), proportional means (proportionality of actions to the aim pursued and to the gravity of the situation), reasonable prospects (reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering), and right authority (decision of the United Nations on military intervention) 52 are fulfilled. International crimes lying at the core of the R2P concept have the status of customary and peremptory norms in the sense that '(...) they are legally binding for all the states regardless of treaties ratified by them, as well as for armed resistance groups with regard to rules applicable to all parties to the international conflict' 53 . With the ratification of the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949 (I-IV) and Protocols Additional to those Conventions of 6 June 1977 (I-II) 54 , states approved the commitment to prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The R2P concept is inadequate in reference to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. First, the precondition for taking a decision on use of force by the UNO or with its authorisation against a sovereign state was not fulfilled (right authority). Second, military intervention should be preceded by a request to the UN Security Council for adequate authorisation (unilateral intervention of a single state is inadmissible and unlawful). Third, Ukraine did not commit international crimes in Crimea. There was no threat of serious and irreversible harm to the population resulting from a destructive strategy of the Ukrainian state. As the population of Crimea was not subject to mass hunger, murders, forced evictions, acts of terror, rapes or civil war, the preconditions for just cause and right intention were not fulfilled. The seizure of Crimea by the Russian Federation does not meet the preconditions for last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects giving a reasonable chance of success in halting and altering the suffering. 
Stance of the UN Security Council on the annexation of crimea
The UN Security Council as political body obliged to maintain international peace and security (Article 24 of UN Charter) did not take a stance on the annexation of Crimea. It was assumed that the Russian Federation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council would block the adoption of a resolution condemning the aggression. A draft resolution that declared the referendum in Crimea on the status of the Crimea region invalid and reaffirmed the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine was voted on 19 March 2014. Owing to Russia's veto, the draft resolution was not adopted . The Resolution establishes the current division of Ukraine without reference to the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. However, it contains provisions concerning reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine (paragraph 9) and withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, mercenaries and military equipment from the territory of Ukraine (paragraph 10). The authorities of Ukraine were obliged to carry out constitutional reform with a new constitution entering into force by the end of 2015 providing for decentralisation as a key element, including a reference to the specificities of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (paragraph 11). Ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine were to be implemented on 15 February 2015, 12:00 a.m. local time (paragraph 1). The terminology used in the Agreement related to exchange of hostages and unlawfully detained persons, amnesty for persons involved in the events that had taken place in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk as well as resumption of economic ties with Ukraine shows that we are dealing with an internal non-international armed conflict in Ukraine.
International responsibility of a state in an armed conflict
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts
The International Law Commission's Draft Articles (hereinafter referred to as ILC) on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted at the 56 th session of the UN General Assembly (Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001) 59 provide for general rules of state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. According to Article 1, every internationally wrongful act (action or omission) of a state entails its international responsibility. A state cannot invoke its internal law in order to justify its conduct not in conformity with its obligation under international law (paragraph 3). The activities of armed units of one state violating international law on the territory of another state give rise to the international responsibility of the former state. The wrongfulness of an act can be precluded in the event of the consent of a state to a given conduct of the other state (e.g. military assistance on request conducted according to terms and modalities agreed with a territorial sovereign) 60 .
State responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law of armed conflicts
According to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), a war of aggression is a crime against international peace giving rise to international responsibility (Article 5 Section 2) 65 . State responsibility for damages resulting from military operations was confirmed for the first time in the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907. Pursuant to Article 3, a belligerent party '(...) shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces' 66 . States acknowledged the responsibility for violation of the laws of war provided for in the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, including the obligation to bring the perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law of armed conflicts to justice. The above-mentioned norm was reflected in Article 91 of the Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions
67
. It is applicable, among others, to armed conflicts resulting from national liberation struggles as well as to groups defined in Article 43 as armed forces. With the adoption of the principle of inadmissibility of avoidance of state responsibility for serious violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 68 , equal treatment of all parties to an armed conflict was guaranteed and, at the same time, established a mechanism to prevent situations of forcing the defeated party to renounce its legal claims.
Criminal responsibility for international crimes is claimed first of all before national courts. The International Criminal Court in Hague 69 , before which Ukraine brought two cases in the first phase of the conflict (the first one concerning the pacification of Euromaidan protesters; the second one concerning the shelling of a bus in Volnovakha in Ukraine with 13 civilians killed) has a complementary character. On the other hand, the ECHR examined two inter-state applications lodged by Ukraine against the Russian Federation 70 . The application 20958/14 of 13 March 2014 concerns the events following the assumption of control by the Russian Federation over the Crimean Peninsula and subsequent developments in Eastern Ukraine 71 . The application 43800/14 of 13 June 2014 concerns the alleged abduction of three groups of Ukrainian orphan children and children without parental care and a number of adults accompanying them. In addition to the above-mentioned applications, there are more than 160 individual applications pending before the Court, lodged against Ukraine or Russia or both. The government of Ukraine announced that it would lodge claims before the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea with its headquarters in Hamburg in order to regain the Crimean Peninsula.
Summary
The contemporary international law faces many challenges. One of them is the development of new concepts, such as hybrid warfare reflecting the eternal tendency of states towards territorial conquests and domination. The referred situation results from the lack of legal definitions of basic concepts relevant to maintaining international peace and security, the tendency to create imprecise legal norms and to blur them, the attempts to apply double standards and improper practice of states. Consequently, the following questions arise: Is international humanitarian law of armed conflicts broad enough to encompass the concept of hybrid warfare that is becoming more and more popular? Is it legitimate to claim that in the face of the recent development of new concepts of conduct of armed conflicts, the norms of international law are subject to revocation or suspension?
One of the greatest threats to peace order in the world is the questioning of the foundations of international law established over the centuries on the basis of such arguments as maintenance of external security, conduct of expansion policy, humanitarian intervention or assistance in the self-determination of peoples. The evolution of international humanitarian law of armed conflicts results from the changes in the course of armed conflicts themselves. However, they do not result, in any case, in revocation of fundamental rules on which the above-mentioned part of international law is based. Both initiation and progression as well as the end phase of an armed conflict are subject to legal control. The right to self-determination of peoples, use of armed force to protect nationals, military assistance on request and responsibility to protect do not justify the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Treaty humanitarian law of armed conflicts requires the observance of adopted regulations and its full implementation in the internal legal systems by the signatory states. The adoption of international obligations in that area by all the states, above all by the superpowers, is desirable. New treaty regulations as a response to the current needs and challenges should be developed only to a small extent. Placing the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the concept of hybrid warfare does not affect the application of international law, in particular international humanitarian law of armed conflicts.
